Got Rights? Not if You’re a Sex Offender in the Seventh Circuit by Caplis, Sheila T.
Seventh Circuit Review 
Volume 2 Issue 1 Article 5 
9-1-2006 
Got Rights? Not if You’re a Sex Offender in the Seventh Circuit 
Sheila T. Caplis 
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sheila T. Caplis, Got Rights? Not if You’re a Sex Offender in the Seventh Circuit, 2 Seventh Circuit Rev. 116 
(2006). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/5 
This Constitutional Law is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent 
College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly 
Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
 116
GOT RIGHTS? NOT IF YOU’RE A SEX OFFENDER 
IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
 
SHEILA T. CAPLIS∗ 
 
Cite as: Sheila T. Caplis, Got Rights? Not if You’re a Sex Offender in the Seventh 




      INTRODUCTION  
 
The convicted sex offender is perhaps the most despised and 
unsympathetic member of American society; and specifically those 
convicted of crimes against children are considered the vilest. The 
societal view of sex offenders is best exemplified by the words of 
Justice Kennedy in McKune v. Lile, where he succinctly stated: “Sex 
offenders are a serious threat in this Nation.”1 This view spans the 
continuum from the most respected jurist to the average person. It 
stems from the fact that these offenders harm children and other 
vulnerable persons.2 It also stems from the belief that since sex 
offenders are released back into society, they are more likely than 
other criminals to re-offend.3 This societal view also makes it easier 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1 536 U.S. 24, 32 (2002) (holding that sexual abuse treatment program for 
prison inmates did not amount compelled self-incrimination). 
2 See id. 
3 Id.; but see ERIC LOTKE, NAT’L CENTER ON INSTITUTIONS AND 
ALTERNATIVES, INC., SEX OFFENSES: FACTS, FICTIONS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 2 
(2006), available at http://66.165.94.98/stories/SexOffendersReport.pdf (noting that 
“[r]ecidivism rates are relatively low, typically running in the 3- 13% range, and 
among the lowest of all types of crimes”).  
1
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for legislatures to justify regulations against sex offenders as 
communities look for ways to reduce the frequency and severity of sex 
crimes.4 
In the name of public safety, localities require sex offenders to 
not only publicly classify themselves but also restrict where sex 
offenders may live and what public spaces sex offenders may enter 
and enjoy.5 These restrictions against sex offenders pass without 
opposition, garner support from the community, and when challenged 
in court are uniformly upheld.6 Not only do the courts dismiss any and 
all constitutional arguments, but they also allude to the fact that any 
restriction against sex offenders would pass rational basis review for 
the safety of children is always a legitimate interest.7 
In September 2006, the United States Circuit Court for the 
Seventh Circuit entertained Brown v. Michigan City, which dealt with 
the “rights” of sex offenders and upheld a law directed at a sex 
offender.8 The Seventh Circuit did not stray from the path set by 
previous courts and may even have gone a step further, upholding an 
ordinance which bans a specific individual from entering public 
parks.9 In upholding this ordinance, the Seventh Circuit has aided the 
general trend to strip convicted sex offenders of their rights. 
Part I focuses on the background of Brown v. Michigan City 
including the facts and reasoning behind the decision as well as the 
                                                 
4 See LOTKE, supra note 3, at 1. 
5 See Richard R. Whidden Jr. and Tiffany A. Richards, Local Government 
Regulation of Sex Offenders: Addressing a Threat, (2006), 
http://www.nationallawcenter.org/news/news/nlc-publishes-article-on-local-sex-
offender-laws.html (stating that fourteen states have enacted residence restrictions 
and three communities have enacted ordinance prohibiting sex offenders from 
visiting parks). See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005) 
6 Patrick Whitnell, Legal Notes: Coping with the Paroled Sex Offender Next 
Door, (2006), http://www.cacities.org/index.jsp?zone=wcm&previewStory=24692# 
7 See, e.g., McKune, 536 U.S. at 33. (stating in regards to Kansas’ Sexual 
Abuse Treatment Program, “[s]tates thus have a vital interest in rehabilitating 
convicted sex offenders”). 
8 462 F.3d 720, 722 (7th Cir. 2006). 
9 Id. 
2
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history of regulations against sex offenders and their constitutionality 
as decided by both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court. Part II 
analyzes the decision made by the Seventh Circuit in Brown v. 
Michigan City. It examines the Seventh Circuit’s decision and finds 
that the deferential use of the rational basis standard of review is 
flawed. If rational basis review is used for each and every sex offender 
law, then any restriction placed on sex offenders will be deemed 
constitutional. This places sex offenders in a unique situation, although 
they are released back into society they do not have the same rights as 
any other citizen and any law which passes rational basis review can 
strip them of even more rights. 
   
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Brown v. Michigan City: The Facts 
 
In 1995, Mr. Brown was convicted of one count of child 
molestation.10 He was sentenced to six years in prison with three years 
suspended.11 After his release, in 1999, Mr. Brown was placed on 
probation for the remaining three years and completed court-required 
counseling.12 Between 1995 and 2002, Mr. Brown complied with sex 
offender laws to the best of his knowledge and had no arrests.13 Each 
day during that time span Mr. Brown did, however, frequent 
Washington Park.14 
Washington Park is a large public park located on Lake 
Michigan.15 Residents may enter Washington Park with a resident 
pass.16 Mr. Brown began visiting Washington Park on a daily basis 
                                                 
10 Id. at 723. 
11 Id. at 723 n.3. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 724. 
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with his wife in 1988.17 When they visited the park, they would, 
according to Mr. Brown, “sit and watch the sunsets and sunrises, drink 
coffee, [and] smoke cigarettes.”18 After his wife’s death, Mr. Brown 
continued this daily ritual.19 Over the course of approximately fourteen 
years, Mr. Brown would drive to Washington Park, park by the lake, 
drink coffee, and smoke cigarettes.20 For the most part, he did not 
leave his vehicle.21 
In 2002, the Michigan City Department of Parks became aware of 
Mr. Brown, when he had been observed at Stone Lake Beach in 
LaPorte, Indiana, watching beach patrons with binoculars.22 An 
investigation by the LaPorte police discovered that Mr. Brown was a 
convicted sex offender.23 Subsequently, the LaPorte Recreation 
Director informed the Michigan City Police Department of Mr. 
Brown.24 The City admits that, while Mr. Brown’s daily activities were 
innocent, combined with his conviction of child molestation, his 
activities raised a “red flag.”25 With this knowledge, police approached 
Mr. Brown in Washington Park on four separate occasions.26 On the 
fourth occasion, a city attorney informed Mr. Brown that he was no 
longer allowed in the park.27 Mr. Brown complied with this order and 
never re-entered Washington Park.28  
                                                 
17 Id. 
18 Id. (quoting Brown’s deposition testimony). 
19 Id. at 722. 
20 Id. Mr. Brown would also “watch people at the beach, sometimes with 
binoculars.” Id. at 722 n.1. While Mr. Brown claims he only watched women on the 
beach, the city council alleges that he watched children and that the “women” he was 
watching were actually teenage girls. Id. 
21 Id. at 722 
22 Id. at 723. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. (quoting Recreation Director Garbacik’s deposition testimony). 
26 Id. at 723- 24. 
27 Id. at 724. 
28 Id. 
4
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On July 31, 2002, the Michigan City Parks and Recreation Board 
informed Mr. Brown of a meeting at the Park Office, located in 
Washington Park, at which the Board would discuss the banning of 
Mr. Brown from Michigan City Park properties.29 Mr. Brown did not 
attend the meeting.30 On August 1, 2002, the Michigan City Parks and 
Recreation Board convened, and a Park Department attorney presented 
Resolution 548, entitled “A Resolution Prohibiting the Use of Park 
Department Properties by an Individual Having a Child Molesting 
History.” 31 
                                                 
29 Id. 
30 Id. Mr. Brown testified in his deposition that he understood that he was 
invited to attend the meeting at the Park Office inside Washington Park but that he 
had been told by police never to re-enter the park. Id. A friend of Mr. Brown spoke 
with the Park Superintendent to determine if Mr. Brown could attend the meeting. Id. 
He received oral confirmation that Mr. Brown could attend without being arrested, 
but the superintendent and the city attorney refused to put this assurance in writing. 
Id. 
31 Id. at 724-25. The resolution provided: 
WHEREAS, it was brought to the attention of this Board by the 
Department staff and the Michigan City Police Department that 
during the period of a recent summer day camp program for 
children conducted at Washington Park, an individual, namely, 
Robert E. Brown . . ., who was recognized by members of the 
Michigan City Police force as a convicted child molester, was 
observed by the Police and the Department staff frequenting 
Washington Park in [a] recreational/camping vehicle, while having 
a set of binoculars and a camera in his possession, and  
WHEREAS, this Board has determined that in order to discharge 
its responsibilities of child protection and safety, it is necessary to 
designate all properties and programs under the jurisdiction of the 
Department to be OFF LIMITS to any person who has been 
convicted of child molesting under Indiana Code, IC 35-42-4-3, or 
convicted of any other sex crime in which the victim is a child 
under the age of 18 years, and to ban such person from all 
Michigan City Parks and Recreation Department properties 
indefinitely.  
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE MICHIGAN 
CITY PARKS AND RECREATION BOARD AS FOLLOWS:  
(1) That ROBERT E. BROWN . . . is hereby BANNED from all 
properties or programs operated under the jurisdiction of the 
5
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In presenting Resolution 548, the Park Department attorney 
explained that Mr. Brown had been involved in a “series of incidents 
. . . involving the safety and protection of children,” had been 
convicted of child molestation, and had been engaged in suspicious 
activity at Washington Park.32 Mr. Brown’s activities included visiting 
the park everyday, on one occasion watching people with binoculars 
and a camera, and on numerous occasions driving slowly by a 
children’s day camp located in the Park.33 The attorney stressed that 
the Board was responsible for the “care, custody, and safety of 
[children who visit the park].”34 The Board unanimously passed the 
Resolution.35 
After Mr. Brown commenced litigation, in August 2002, the 
Board reconvened for a special session without notifying Mr. Brown.36 
At the session the Board rescinded Resolution 548 and passed in its 
stead Resolution 552, entitled “A Resolution Prohibiting the Use of 
Park Department Properties by an Individual Having a Child 
Molesting History, Whose Observed Behavior Constitutes a Threat to 
the Safety of Children.”37 Resolution 552 is substantially similar to its 
predecessor except that rather than making the park properties “OFF 
                                                                                                                   
Michigan City Department of Parks and Recreation and that in the 
event said individual is found upon any such property, he shall be 
considered a trespasser, and shall be removed forthwith, or be 
subject to arrest for failure to depart the premises.  
(2) That all properties and programs operated under the jurisdiction 
of this Department are hereby declared OFF LIMITS to any person 
who has been convicted of child molesting under Indiana Code, IC 
35-42-4-3, or convicted of any other sex crime in which the victim 
is a child under the age of 18 years, and in the event that such 
individual is identified and found upon any such property, he shall 
be considered a trespasser and shall be ordered to remove himself 
forthwith, or be subject to arrest for failure to depart the premises. 
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LIMITS to any person who has been convicted of child molesting 
under Indiana Code, IC 35-42-4-3, or convicted of any other sex crime 
in which the victim is a child under the age of 18 years,” Resolution 
552 makes the Michigan City Parks “OFF LIMITS to the said Mr. 
Robert E. Brown who has been convicted of child molesting under 
Indiana Code, IC 35-42-4-3, and whose observed behavior in 
Washington Park is deemed by this Board to constitute a threat to the 
safety of children.”38 
The Park attorney explained at the meeting that the proposed 
change was necessary to prevent Mr. Brown from a successful motion 
for class certification.39 The attorney stated: “Resolution No. 548 must 
be ‘narrowly tailored’ and it is ‘narrowly tailored’ if it targets and 
eliminates no more tha[n] the exact source of evil it seeks to 
remedy.”40 The Park Board unanimously voted to rescind Resolution 
548 and to adopt Resolution 552.41 
 
B. Brown v. Michigan: The Decision 
 
Mr. Brown attacked Resolution 552 on three separate 
constitutional grounds.42 He claimed that this ordinance violates his 
substantive property interest in the Michigan City Parks and his 
substantive liberty interest based upon damage to his reputation, and 
that the application of this resolution violated his procedural due 
process rights.43  
The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Indiana dismissed each of these claims and granted summary judgment 
in favor of Michigan City.44 It held that Mr. Brown had neither a 
                                                 
38 Id. at 725-26 (emphasis added). 





44 Brown v. Michigan City, No. 3:02 CV 572 RM, 2005 WL 2281502, at *12 
(N.D. Ind. 2005). 
7
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protected property interest to enter a public park nor a protected liberty 
interest in his reputation to demand due process protections.45  It also 
stated that although the right of access to a public park may be 
important, it is not fundamental.46 The district court further found that 
the ban was rationally related to the compelling interest of protecting 
children, noting that Michigan City was not “bound to wait until Mr. 
[Brown] again committed child molestation or attempted child 
molestation in order to act.”47  Finally, the district court inquired as to 
whether this ban was an arbitrary exercise of power.48 It reasoned that 
the ban was not an arbitrary exercise of power as the ban did not 
“shock the contemporary conscience.”49 
The Seventh Circuit50 affirmed the district court’s opinion and 
held that the Michigan City Park Ordinance violated neither 
substantive due process nor procedural due process.51 The court 
reasoned that Mr. Brown is not entitled to a constitutional property 
interest in the public parks, that Mr. Brown failed to demonstrate he 
was deprived of a valid liberty interest, and that, because no valid 
property or liberty interest was involved, it was not necessary to 
analyze what process was due to Mr. Brown.52  
 
1. Substantive Due Process 
 
The Seventh Circuit held that, according to the United States 
Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg,53 there is only a narrow 
category of fundamental rights—“the rights to marry, to have children, 
to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, to marital 
                                                 
45 Id. at *5-7. 
46 Id. at *11. 
47 Id. at *12 (quoting Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 767 n.8). 
48 Brown, 2005 WL 2281502, at *12. 
49 Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 n.8 (1998). 
50 The panel consisted of Judges Ripple, Manion, and Kanne. 
51 Brown v. Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720, 734 (7th Cir. 2006). 
52 Id. at 729-32. 
53 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
8
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privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion.”54 
The court found that the right to enter a public park is not contained in 
this narrow list and that the list should not be expanded to include it.55 
Further, the court found that the ban of Mr. Brown was rationally 
related to the goal of protecting the children of the community and 
thus passes rational basis review.56 
 
2. Procedural Due Process 
 
To determine whether Resolution 522 violated procedural due 
process the Seventh Circuit first analyzed whether Mr. Brown was 
deprived of a protected interest and whether process was due.57 The 
court relied on the framework propounded by the Supreme Court in 
Mathews v. Eldridge58 focusing on factors such as the private interest 
affected by the official action, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
such an interest, and the probable value of procedural safeguards.59 
The court reasoned that for there to be a property interest an 
individual must have a legitimate claim of entitlement.60 The court 
found that the distribution of park passes to residents did not create a 
legitimate interest in visiting the park.61 Accordingly, the Constitution 
does not guarantee access to Washington Park.62 Further, the court 
reasoned that for Michigan City to have implicated a liberty interest, 
the ordinance needed to not only defame Mr. Brown but also to alter 
his legal status, such as depriving him of a right.63  The court found 
                                                 
54 Brown, 462 F.3d at 732 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720) (noting that 
there may also be a right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment). 
55 Brown, 462 F.3d at 732.   
56 Id. at 734. 
57 Id. at 728. 
58 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
59 Brown, 462 F.3d at 728. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 729. 
63 Id. at 730 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)). 
9
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that Mr. Brown’s claims did not satisfy these requirements, because he 
could not establish that he had a right to enter the public park.64 
For Mr. Brown’s procedural due process claims, the court held 
that Mr. Brown was neither deprived of a property interest or a liberty 
interest, and accordingly did not need to determine whether Mr. Brown 
received adequate process.65 
 
C. Regulating Sex Offenders 
 
The term “sex offender” has two broad definitions. A sex offender 
can be: 
 
[A]ny person who willfully and lewdly commits any 
lewd or lascivious act, upon or with the body, or any 
part or member thereof, of a child who is under the age 
of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing, or 
gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that 
person or the child.66 
 
Or, a sex offender can be defined as “any person who commits an act 
by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and 
unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person.”67  
                                                 
64 Brown, 462 F.3d at 731. 
65 Id. 
66 MARCUS NIETO & DAVID JUNG, CAL. STATE LIBRARY, THE IMPACT OF 
RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS ON SEX OFFENDERS AND CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES: A LITERATURE REVIEW 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/06/08/06-008.pdf (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) 
(West 2005)). In Indiana, a sex offender is an individual who has been convicted of 
any of the following offenses or has attempted to commit any of the following 
offenses: rape, criminal deviate conduct, child molesting, child exploitation, 
vicarious sexual gratification, child solicitation, child seduction, sexual misconduct 
with a minor, incest, sexual battery, kidnapping if the victim is less than 18, criminal 
confinement if the victim is less than 18, and possession of child pornography. IC 
11-8-8-5. 
67 NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 1 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(b)(1)).   
10
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In a given year, there are 60,000 to 70,000 arrests for child sexual 
assault and 15,000 to 20,000 arrests for rape.68 Child molesters are 
likely to recidivate at a rate of 12.7%, whereas rapists have a 
recidivism rate of 18.9%.69 Currently, there are an estimated 550,000 
registered sex offenders in this country.70 Because of this large number 
and the belief that sexual offenders are more likely to be repeat 
offenders, legislatures use a variety of policies to protect the public 
against sex offenders.71 Specifically, sex offender legislation is 
intended to prevent the occurrence of sex offenses.72  
In 1994, Congress enacted the Jacob Wetterling Act which 
requires sex offender registration.73 Two years later, Congress enacted 
                                                 
68 NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 1 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME CHARACTERISTICS: VICTIM/OFFENDER RELATIONSHIP 
(2004)).  
69 NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 2. 
70 Id. 
71 See LOTKE, supra note 3, at 2; but see id. at 2-3 (citing to Solicitor General 
of Canada Karl Hanson’s 2004 study finding that the overall recidivism rate for new 
sex crimes is 13.7%, the recidivism rate for child molestation is 12.7%, the 
recidivism rate for child molestation within families is 8.4%, and the recidivism rate 
for rape is 18.9%); see also id. at 2 (quoting DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND 
CORRECTION, STATE OF OHIO, TEN YEAR RECIDIVISM FOLLOW-UP OF 1989 SEX 
OFFENDER RELEASES 12 (2001)): 
Certainly any instance of sexual recidivism is cause for concern, 
and we should not lose sight that even a 1% sexual recidivism rate 
represents a certain number of victims of sexual assault.  However, 
there is a rather widespread misconception that sex offenders, as a 
whole, are repeat offenders.  While this study is obviously unable 
to determine the actual rate of reoffense, it is clear that a sex 
offender returning to an Ohio prison for a new offense is a fairly 
unusual occurrence. 
Compared to other recidivism rates—79% for stealing motor vehicles and 77% for 
possession of stolen property—sexual recidivism is extremely low. See LOTKE, 
supra note 3, at 3; see also NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 2 (noting that on 
average the “recidivism rates for all types of sex offenders are lower than for other 
offenders”). 
72 See LOTKE, supra note 3, at 1. 
73 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender 
Registration Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006). 
11
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Megan’s Law requiring states to make sex offender registries available 
to the public.74 Following the lead of Congress, states began passing 
similar legislation.75 All fifty of the states have registration 
requirements and make the registries available to the public.76 
Seventeen states have civil commitment statutes for “sexually violent 
predators.”77 These statutes require that a sex offender who has been 
adjudicated a “sexually violent predator” be committed to a medical 
facility after completion of his criminal sentence.78 
Further, local legislatures have begun passing distance marker 
legislation and child safety zone legislation.79 Distance marker 
legislation provides that sex offenders cannot reside within a certain 
distance of schools, daycare centers, or any other places where 
children gather.80 Child safety zone legislation provides that a sex 
offender may not loiter within certain feet of areas where children may 
congregate.81 The Michigan City Parks and Recreation Board’s 
ordinance banning Mr. Brown from all Michigan City parks is the 
logical extension of the general trend in sex offender legislation.82  It 
                                                 
74 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e); see also NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 2.  
75 See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003); Smith v. 
Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
76 NIETO & JUNG, supra 66, at 8-9. 
77 Id. at 3. 
78 Id. 
79 See id.; see also Whitnell supra note 5 (noting that some localities have also 
begun creating Zoning Dispersal legislation which limit the number of sex offenders 
who may live in the same residential dwelling). 
80 See NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 3 (noting that 22 states have enacted 
some form of distance marker legislation, ranging from 500 feet to 2,500 feet). In 
Illinois a child sex offender cannot reside within 500 feet of a school or school 
property. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/11-9.3(b-5) (2006). In Indiana, a violent sex 
offender cannot reside within 1,000 feet of any school property for the duration of 
parole. IND. CODE § 11-13-3-4(g)(2)(B)(2006). Wisconsin does not have a sex 
offender residency restriction law. 
81 See NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 15 (Typical distance is 300 ft.  No 
reported court decisions affecting Child Safety Zone legislation, but two courts have 
upheld band from city parks). 
82 See Brown v. Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720 (7th Cir 2006). 
12
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demonstrates how sex offender legislation has narrowed from the 
general to the specific and how sex offender legislation has the ability 
to strip sex offenders of their rights.83  
 
 
D. Constitutional Challenges 
 
Before the United States Supreme Court, the laws directed against 
sex offenders have experienced constitutional challenges from various 
fronts.84 Sex offender laws have been attacked on various bases 
including violating the First Amendment, the ex post facto clause, and 
double jeopardy.85 Under each challenge, state and federal courts have 
upheld legislation directed at sex offenders.86  
Regardless of whether there has been a violation or not, the Court 
has held that the laws directed against sex offenders pass rational basis 
review; the laws are deemed are rational means to the legitimate goal 
of protecting children.87 The Court, finding that no violation has 
occurred under any of these theories, applies the less stringent rational 
basis review.88 Under this standard, each of these laws passes muster.89 
For example, “residency restrictions do not offend the equal protection 
clause. They represent a rational legislative determination that 
excluding sex offenders from areas where children congregate will 
advance the state’s interest in protecting children.”90 
 
                                                 
83 Id. 
84 See NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 43. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102-03 (2003); McKune v. Lile, 536 
U.S. 24, 48 (2002). 
88 See, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 102-03; McKune, 536 U.S. at 48. 
89 See, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 102-03; McKune, 536 U.S. at 48. 
90 NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 44. 
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1. The Supreme Court  
 
In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme Court upheld the civil 
commitment of a sexually violent predator under the Kansas Sexually 
Violent Predator Act.91 The Act which intended to prevent recidivism, 
established a procedure to civilly commit for long term care a sex 
offender who is deemed to be a “sexually violent predator.”92 
Specifically, in Kansas, Hendricks sought to prevent the state from 
committing him as sexually violent predator after he had served his 
prison sentence.93 The Court found that the act did not violate the 
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, the ban on ex post 
facto lawmaking, or due process.94 In addressing the substantive due 
process argument, the Court noted that although freedom from 
physical restraint is a core liberty interest, an “involuntary civil 
confinement of a limited subclass of dangerous persons” is not 
contrary to the understanding of ordered liberty.95 Further, because the 
Act entails civil commitment proceedings, it is non-punitive and 
therefore does not violate double jeopardy or the ex post facto clause.96 
In 2000, the Supreme Court revisited the alleged punitive nature of 
civil commitment legislation.97 It found Washington’s Community 
Protection Act98 constitutional as the statute was civil rather than 
criminal.99  The Court, expanding its holding in Kansas v. Hendricks, 
held that a civil commitment of a sexually violent predator is 
constitutional both facially and as applied.100 
                                                 
91 521 U.S. 346, 350-53 (1997); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a01 et seq. (1994). 
92 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a01 et seq. (1994). 
93 Kansas, 521 U.S. at 354. 
94 Id. at 371. 
95 Id. at 357. 
96 Id. at 369. 
97 See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001). 
98 Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.010 et seq. (1992). 
99 Seling, 531 U.S at 260-61. 
100 Id. at 267. 
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In 2003, the Supreme Court upheld the Alaska Sex Offender 
Registration Act.101 The Act which requires registration and 
community notification was criticized as constituting retroactive 
punishment.102 The Court reasoned that the Alaska law is not punitive, 
and thus does not violate the ex post facto clause.103 However, a 
dissenting Justice Stevens noted that proper analysis would have 
included asking whether the registration statue affects a protected 
liberty interest.104  
Similarly, in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, the 
Court upheld Connecticut’s Megan’s Law on procedural due process 
grounds.105 It held that states are permitted to classify all sex offenders 
as a group and require registration and notification.106 Here, the Court 
did not address substantive due process, but Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence suggests that there is the possibility that such a claim may 
be successful.107 Justice Scalia noted: “Absent a claim . . . that the 
liberty interest in question is so fundamental as to implicate so-called 
‘substantive’ due process, a properly enacted law can eliminate it.”108  
Accordingly, as there was no claim that this violated substantive due 
process, the law was held constitutional.109 
These cases dealing with sex offender legislation decided by the 
Supreme Court demonstrate the Court’s trend to uphold sex offender 
legislation against attacks on various constitutional fronts.110 These 
                                                 
101 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 85 (2003); Alaska Stat. §§ 12.63.010(a), (b) 
(2000).  
102 Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. 
103 Id. at 105-06. 
104 Id. at 111-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding both that a protected liberty 
interest as involved and that registration and notification requirements are punitive). 
105 Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§§ 54-251, 54-252, 54-254 (2001). 
106 Conn., 538 U.S. at 8. 
107 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003); Conn., 538 U.S. 1; Seling v. Young, 
531 U.S. 250 (2001); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
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cases also demonstrate that substantive due process may be the only 
successful claim available.111 
 
2. The Seventh Circuit 
 
The Seventh Circuit has also established a line of precedent 
upholding claims against sex offender laws.112 Further, the Seventh 
Circuit has specifically addressed the issue of a regulation specifically 
banning a sex offender from a public park.113  
In 2003, in Doe v. Lafayette, a Seventh Circuit panel held that 
banning sex offenders from a public park violates the First 
Amendment because it punishes a person for his thoughts.114 In 
comparing the sex offender to other criminals, the court noted:  
 
[W]e would not sanction criminal punishment of an 
individual with a criminal history of bank robbery (a 
crime, like child molestation, with a high rate of 
recidivism . . .) simply because she or he stood in the 
parking lot of a bank and thought about robbing 
it. . . . [Further,] punishment of a drug addict who 
stands outside a dealer’s house craving a hit but 
successfully resists the urge to enter and purchase drugs 
would be offensive to our understanding of the bounds 
of the criminal law.115 
 
                                                 
111 See Conn., 538 U.S. at 8. 
112 See, e.g., Doe v. City of Lafayette (Lafayette II), 377 F.3d 757, 774 (7th. 
Cir. 2004) (rejecting petitioner’s challenges based on the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.). 
113 Doe v. City of Lafayette (Lafayette I), 334 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2003), rev’d 
on reh’g en banc, Lafayette II, 377 F.3d 757. 
114 334 F.3d at 613. 
115 Id. at 612. 
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However, in 2004, on rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed 
the panel’s decision by holding that the park ban does not violate 
either the First Amendment or Due Process.116 
In Doe v. Lafayette, Doe, a convicted sex offender, was banned 
from all public parks in Lafayette, Indiana.117 Doe had a long history 
of arrests and crimes for sexual offenses directed towards children.118 
The act that precipitated the ban was Doe’s “cruising” the parks and 
watching children, actions that were brought to the attention of the 
Lafayette Police Department.119 Doe admits that he went to a public 
park, and upon seeing some children, felt that he should leave before 
he did anything.120 In his own words, Doe stated regarding the 
occurrence: 
 
When I saw the three, the four kids there, my thoughts 
were thoughts I had before when I see children, 
possibly expose myself to them, I thought of the 
possibility of, you know, having some kind of sexual 
contact with the kids, but I know with four kids there, 
that’s pretty difficult to do. It’s a wide open area. Those 
thoughts were there, but they, you know, weren’t 
realistic at the time. They were just thoughts.121 
 
Subsequently, the superintendent of the Lafayette Parks and 
Recreation Department sent a letter to Doe informing him that he was 
prohibited from entering any of the City’s parks.122 
The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that Doe was not being 
punished for his impure thoughts in violation of the First 
                                                 
116 Lafayette II, 377 F.3d at 758. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 759. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 760 (quoting Doe’s deposition testimony). 
122 Id. 
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Amendment.123 The court reasoned that the City did not ban Doe from 
the parks for having these thoughts; rather, the City banned him 
because these were not mere thoughts because he was on the brink of 
acting on these thoughts.124 The court also held that Doe was not being 
deprived a fundamental right, because his right to enter the parks is not 
“fundamental.”125 The court relied on the same reasoning it applied in 
Brown v. Michigan.126 The court emphasized the narrowness of 
fundamental rights and presented an exhaustive list of those rights 
which have been deemed fundamental.127 The Seventh Circuit 
continued stating: 
 
By banning Mr. Doe from the parks, the City only has 
deprived him of the “right” to go to the City’s parks 
which he wishes to use for allegedly innocent, 
recreational purposes. That this right is not 
“fundamental” to Mr. Doe’s personhood is readily 
apparent not only from a comparison to other 
“fundamental” rights, but also from the fact that Mr. 
Doe has not even entered the City’s parks since at least 
1990.128 
 
Finding that the City had violated neither the First nor Fourteenth 
Amendments, the court applied the rational basis standard to review 
the City’s ban.129 The banning of a sex offender from entering a public 
park is rationally related to the interest in protecting children.130 
Further, the court alluded that this ban would also pass the higher 
standard of strict scrutiny because the interest in protecting children is 
                                                 
123 Id. at 766. 
124 Id. at 767. 
125 Id. at 770. 
126 See Brown v. Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720, 732 (7th Cir. 2006). 
127 Lafayette II, 377 F.3d at 770-71. 
128 Id. at 771. 
129 Id. at 773. 
130 See id. 
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compelling, and the ban of one sex offender based on his near relapse 
is narrowly tailored.131 
More recently, the Seventh Circuit in Harris v. Donahue 
remanded a prison inmate case where the Department of Prisons 
banned minor children from visiting sex offender parents.132 The court 
recognized that there is a cause of action as to whether this ban 
violates a due process liberty interest to associate with your own kids 
but offered no opinion as to whether it would be successful.133 
The Seventh Circuit has been less consistent than the Supreme 
Court in regards to legislation directed against sex offenders; in some 
decisions it has demonstrated their unconstitutionality and in others it 
has emphasized the possibility for successful claims.134 However, as 
with the Supreme Court, precedent still holds that these laws will be 
held constitutional under the rational basis standard of review.135 
 
 II. ANALYSIS OF BROWN V. MICHIGAN CITY 
 
Although precedent demonstrates that claims against sex offender 
legislation have been almost universally unsuccessful, it is less clear 
whether a court would view such regulations as a deprivation of 
rights.136 Precedent has left the door open to whether there can be a 
successful substantive due process challenge.137 In Brown, the Seventh 
Circuit closes this door.138 Technically, the Seventh Circuit remains 
true to both its own precedent as well as the general trend of Supreme 
                                                 
131 Id. at 773-74. 
132 Harris v. Donahue, 175 Fed. Appx. 746, 748 (7th Cir. 2006). 
133 Id. 
134 See id; Doe v. City of Lafayette (Lafayette I), 334 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2003), 
rev’d on reh’g en banc, Lafayette II, 377 F.3d 757. 
135 See Lafayette II, 377 F.3d 757. 
136 See, e.g., id. at 770-71; Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001). 
137 See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) 
138 Brown v. Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720, 732 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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Court precedent.139 However, it fails to look at other factors and seems 
to be focused on obtaining the “popular” outcome. 
 
A. Brown v. Michigan City: Sex offenders do not have a property 
interest in visiting and enjoying a public park. 
 
In Brown v. Michigan, the court rejected the argument that Mr. 
Brown had a fundamental right to enter and enjoy the parks in 
Michigan City, Indiana.140 The court reasoned that an individual must 
have a legitimate claim of entitlement in order to claim a property 
interest and that Mr. Brown did not have a legitimate expectation of 
enjoying a city park, even though admission to the park is free to 
Michigan City residents and even though Mr. Brown had a history and 
practice of entering and enjoying Washington Park.141 
It is widely accepted that a fundamental right is a right which is 
deeply rooted in this “[n]ation’s history, legal traditions, and 
practices.”142 To state that the openness of public parks is not deeply 
rooted in our history, legal traditions, and practices is a difficult 
proposition to make.143 Since this nation’s inception, tracts of land 
have been held in trust for public use and public enjoyment.144 Legal 
analysis and tradition rely upon the openness of parks:145 
 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they 
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public and, time out of mind, have been used for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such 
                                                 
139 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003); Conn., 538 U.S. 1; Seling, 531 U.S. 
250; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
140 Brown, 462 F.3d at 732-33. 
141 Id. at 732. 
142 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). 
143 See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) 
144 See 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1557 (2006). 
145 See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16. 
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use of the streets and public places has, from ancient 
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, 
and liberties of citizens. 
 
Specifically, First Amendment forum analysis relies on the concept 
that parks are open, making “streets and parks” the paradigmatic 
location for free expression.146 And in practice parks are held open to 
the public; the general public cannot be excluded from a park for an 
unreasonable duration147 and a particular class of persons cannot 
arbitrarily be excluded from entering and enjoying a public park.148 
Further, in City of Chicago v. Morales, a plurality of the Court 
stated that there is a fundamental right to loiter in a public place.149 In 
determining the constitutionality of the city of Chicago’s gang 
loitering ordinance, it noted that “an individual’s decision to remain in 
a public place of his choice is as much a part of his liberty as the 
freedom of movement inside frontiers that is ‘a part of our 
heritage.’”150  The plurality thus stated that “the freedom to loiter for 
innocent purposes is part of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”151 The Supreme Court has also 
held that there is a fundamental interest in interstate travel, but it is 
                                                 
146 See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951); United States v. 
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983).  In the public forum, speech may be regulated, but 
it may be abridged or denied.  Hague, 307 U.S. at 516. 
147 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1557 (2006) (citing Nebraska City v. 
Nebraska City Speed & Fair Ass’n, 186 N.W. 374 (Neb. 1922); Sherburne v. City of 
Portsmouth, 58 A. 38 (N.H. 1904)). 
148 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1557 (2006) (citing Blackman Health 
Resort v. City of Atlanta, 151 S.E. 525 (Ga. 1921)). 
149 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999); but see id. at 83 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 98 (stating that there is no constitutional right to loiter). 
150 City of Chicago, 527 U.S. at 54 (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 
(1958)). 
151 City of Chicago, 527 U.S. at 53. 
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unclear whether there is a comparable interest in intrastate travel and 
whether entering a public park would constitute intrastate travel.152 
The Seventh Circuit’s narrow construction of what is a 
fundamental right fails to analyze all the relevant factors; it fails to 
examine the history and openness of parks, the importance of parks in 
legal doctrine, and the general freedoms to travel and loiter.153 The 
right to enter a park does not fit into any of the pigeon-holed rights 
that the Supreme Court has deemed fundamental.154 However, like 
these rights, there is a history, tradition, and practice of opening parks 
to the public.155 Further the right to loiter and the right to travel 
support that argument that there may be a right, or at least an interest 
in access to public parks.156 
Additionally, in Doe v. Lafayette, the Seventh Circuit analyzed 
whether the right to enter the parks was fundamental to the 
individual.157 It determined that because Doe had not entered the parks 
in over twelve years, his personhood was not implicated.158 This is 
factually distinct from the situation in Brown.159 Mr. Brown had been 
entering and enjoying the parks for over fifteen years.160 Not only did 
he go to Washington Park as part of his daily schedule, but he enjoyed 
                                                 
152 See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254-56 (1974) 
(reasoning that there is a right to intrastate travel); but see Bray v. Alexandria 
Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1993) (commenting that there is not a 
fundamental right to intrastate travel). 
153 See Brown v. Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720, 732-33 (7th Cir. 2006) 
154 See id. at 732. 
155 See 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1557 (2006); see also Hague v. 
Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
156 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999); Memorial Hosp. v. 
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254-56 (1974). 
 157 Doe v. Lafayette (“Lafayette II”), 377 F.3d 757, 771 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(reasoning that the right to enter a park “is not ‘fundamental’ to Mr. Doe’s 
personhood . . . from the fact that Mr. Doe has not even entered the City’s parks 
since at least 1990”) 
158 Id.  
159 See Brown v. Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720, 722 (7th Cir. 2006). 
160 Id. 
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the park for other purposes such as fishing, boating, and picnicking.161 
Unlike Doe, Mr. Brown’s personhood was implicated by the ban.162 
These cases and the facts present in Brown v. Michigan City 
demonstrate that an argument can be made that a fundamental interest 
or right has been implicated.163 However, the Seventh Circuit brushes 
aside this case law and these factual distinctions and decides the case 
as if the ban against Mr. Brown was no different than any other 
restriction against a sex offender.164 
 
B. Brown v. Michigan City: Sex offenders do not have a liberty interest 
in protecting their reputation. 
 
The Seventh Circuit also rejected Mr. Brown’s claim that 
Michigan City infringed upon his liberty interest in his reputation by 
classifying him as a “present threat” to children in the ordinance.165 In 
doing so, the court relied on the test created in Paul v. Davis.166 There, 
the Supreme Court held that mere injury to reputation alone does not 
deprive an individual of a liberty interest.167 In order to successfully 
claim that one is deprived of a liberty interest, the claimant must show 
not only that his reputation was harmed but also that his legal status 
has been altered as well.168 
Mr. Brown is a sex offender and based upon general sex offender 
registration and notification laws, Mr. Brown will always be known as 
                                                 
161 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 5, Brown v. Michigan City, No. 05-3912 
(7th Cir. Sept. 5th, 2006). 
162 Compare Brown, 462 F.3d at 722, with Lafayette II, 377 F.3d at 771. 
163 See Brown, 462 F.3d 720; City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 
(1999); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254-56 (1974); Hague 
v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
164 Brown, 462 F.3d at 732-34. 
165 Id. at  729-30. 
166 Id. at 730. 
167 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976). 
168 Id. 
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a sex offender.169 According to the law of Indiana, he has a reporting 
duty for life.170 His name, address, photograph, physical description, 
and crime are readily available for anyone to view.171 The legislation 
in this case is different.172 This is special legislation directed at Mr. 
Brown in his individual capacity.173 The Park Board had given him a 
different status than other sex offenders.174 Not only must he comply 
with all other city, county, state, and federal laws, but Mr. Brown must 
also comply with a park ordinance which bans him from all city 
parks.175 This is an alteration of his legal status.176 He has lost a right 
that every other citizen and every other sex offender in Michigan City 
still holds.177 Additionally beyond this altered status, Mr. Brown is 
also known as a “present threat.”178 
The facts in this case may satisfy the requirements of Paul v. 
Davis179; however, the Seventh Circuit was quick to come to the 
decision that Mr. Brown did not have an altered status and that he was 
not denied a right.180 This is another example of how leniently sex 
                                                 
169 See IND. CODE 11-8-8-7 (2006); see also Offender Detail for Robert Eugene 
Brown, Indiana Sheriffs’ Sex Offender Registry, 
http://www.insor.org/insasoweb/details.do?sid=339457.011 (last visited December 5, 
2006). 
170 See IND. CODE 11-8-8-7. 
171 Id. 
172 Reporting and residency restrictions apply to all sex offenders, whereas this 
ordinance applies solely to Mr. Brown. 
173 See Brown, 462 F.3d at 726. Special legislation is legislation directed a 
particular person or class, as opposed to the general public. BARRON’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (2003). Special legislation is valid as long as it comports with the 
Constitution, specifically the 14th Amendment. Id. Special legislation must pass 
rational basis review. Id. 




178 Id. at 729. 
179 See 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976). 
180 Brown, 462 F.3d at 730. 
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offender legislation is reviewed, allowing rights of a whole class of 
people, and in some cases an individual, to be stripped away. 
 
C. Brown v. Michigan City: Rational Basis Review 
 
In Brown v. Michigan City the court, having found no 
constitutional violation, reviewed the park ordinance under the rational 
basis standard of review.181 According to this standard, the government 
interest must be legitimate and the means employed to meet that end 
must be rational.182 Under this deferential standard it is easy to see 
why sex offender laws pass constitutional muster.183 The Michigan 
City Park Board has a legitimate reason for keeping Mr. Brown out of 
the parks.184 He is a convicted sex offender, specifically a child 
molester, who frequently visits a park where children are present.185 
The legitimate reason is the interest in protecting children from a sex 
offender.186 The means to that end is also rational; the City is 
preventing one known child molester from entering a park where 
children are present.187 
However, it would not be as easy for sex offender legislation to be 
found constitutional if the courts applied a higher standard of scrutiny, 
such as strict scrutiny.188 For strict scrutiny there needs to be a 
compelling governmental interest and means narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest.189 Any municipality can argue that the protection of 
children and other victims is a compelling interest, but a court must 
                                                 
181 Id. at 733.  
182 Id. 
183 See id. at 733-34 (noting that children are vulnerable members of society 
which the City must shield from sexual abuse). 
184 Id. at 734. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id.  
188 See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005). 
189 Id. 
25
Caplis: Got Rights? Not if You’re a Sex Offender in the Seventh Circuit
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
 141
determine whether that interest is served by the law and whether that 
law is narrowly tailored.190  
Strict scrutiny should be applied to the park ordinance.  It should 
be applied because the ordinance deals with a fundamental property 
right to access a public park and a fundamental liberty interest in one’s 
reputation.191 Alternatively, it should also be applied because this 
ordinance is based upon a suspect classification: a prior sex offense.192 
Sex offenders, based on registration and notification, are an easily 
identifiable group with little political power.193 On the other hand 
those that legislate against sex offenders have the power of the public 
behind them.194  A heightened protection is necessary to ensure the 
validity of laws against sex offenders.195  Accordingly, because of the 
implication of fundamental rights and the classification of sex 
offender, strict scrutiny is necessary to judge the park ordinance.196 In 
Brown the ordinance is narrowly tailored because the Park Board 
modified its ordinance after the commencement of the litigation to 
only affect Mr. Brown.197 It is less clear whether this ordinance 
actually serves its purpose.198  Thus, this ordinance may not pass strict 
scrutiny review because although it is narrowly tailored, and although 
there is a compelling interest, there is no obvious nexus or evidence as 
to whether the children in the Michigan City parks are safer because 
one convicted sex offender is no longer permitted to enter the parks. 
 
                                                 
190 Id. 
191 See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 815 (2006).  
192 See id. 
193 Bret R. Hobson, Banishing Acts: How Far May States Go to Keep 
Convicted Sex Offenders Away From Children?, 40 GA. L. REV. 961, 987 (2006) 
(citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803)). 
194 See id. at 987-88. 
195 Id. 
196 See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 815. 
197 Brown v. Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2006). 
198 See id. If the purpose to protect children, the banning of one particular sex 
offender as opposed to all sex offender seems to not serve the purpose.  See also 
Whitnell, supra note 5. 
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D. What rights should sex offenders be entitled to? 
 
Sex offenders rest in a gray area of civil rights. Registration and 
required public access make sex offenders an easily identifiable 
group.199 Distance marker legislation and child safety zone legislation 
are quickly limiting where convicted sex offenders may live, work, 
and even loiter.200 Sexually violent predator acts commit sex offenders 
even after their sentence has been served.201 All of these laws place 
restrictions upon sex offenders after they have served their sentence, 
and place heavy restrictions upon sex offenders as they re-enter 
society.202 Upon re-entrance, they have neither the rights of an 
imprisoned individual nor the rights of an ordinary citizen.203 
Brown v. Michigan City represents, yet another law which restricts 
the liberty of a sex offender and strips away a sex offender’s rights.204 
The Seventh Circuit responded to the question of whether sex 
offenders have rights in the negative.205 This decision allows a piece of 
special legislation by a municipality to ban one individual from 
entering the public parks.206 It stands for the proposition that a sex 
offender does not have the right of access or enjoyment to a public 
space because of his past crime.207 This may lead to a slippery 
slope.208 Here, Mr. Brown is not allowed in the park because he is a 
threat to children, but what is there to stop possible future legislation 
which may ban a sex offender from a library, museum, etc., because 
children may be present.209 Brown also stands for the proposition that a 
                                                 
199 See NIETO, supra note 66 at 8-9. 
200 See id. at 3; see also Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005). 
201 See NIETO, supra note 66 at 3; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346.  
202 See Whitnell, supra note 5. 
203 See Hobson, supra note 193 at 988. 
204 Brown v. Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2006). 
205 Id. at 734. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 See id. 
209 Id. 
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sex offender’s liberty interest is not implicated when a legislating body 
creates a tailored piece of legislation which not only names and 
identifies a particular person, but calls him a “present threat.”210 
Sex offenders are a class of individuals who are an easy target for 
legislation.211 However, the judiciary cannot in good faith strictly 
uphold each and every act, law, or ordinance directed against sex 
offenders.212 Although the majority of the population may approve of 
sex offender laws and although at the core of the law there may be a 
rational basis, the judiciary still has a constitutional duty to protect 
citizens from the “tyranny of the majority.”213 It can be argued that: 
 
Justices betray their duty of judicial review when they 
turn substantive due process analysis into a mere 
academic exercise, placing a few defined pigeonholes 
of fundamental rights on one side that receive strict 
scrutiny protection from legislative threats and 
relegating everything else to a second side that triggers 
only highly deferential review. If courts blindly apply 
rational basis review whenever the threatened right is 
deemed less than fundamental, even the most severe, 
unfair restraint may survive.214 
 
In the realm of sex offender laws, whether the claim is based on 
fundamental rights or other punitive challenges, the courts have 
continually found no violation and the ordinance always passes the 
deferential review granted.215 But, a heightened standard is necessary 
to justify certain regulations against sex offenders because sex 
offenders resemble a discrete and insular minority with no political 
                                                 
210 Id. 
211 Whitnell, supra note 5. 
212 See Hobson, supra note 193 at 988. 
213 Id. at 989. 
214 Id. at 988. 
215 See, e.g., Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001); Doe v. City of Lafayette, 
377 F.3d 757, 770- 71 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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power and because sex offender laws substantially restrict where a sex 




Focusing solely on the general trend, the Seventh Circuit 
conformed to precedent. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh 
Circuit has struck down a piece of sex offender legislation based on a 
constitutional challenge. However, this is not good policy. Although 
sex offenders may be a serious threat to society, the judiciary cannot 
base their decisions solely on the status of the individual. Sex offender 
legislation punishes those who have already fulfilled their sentence. It 
is upon their re-entrance to society that legislation restricts their 
freedoms. To restrict them solely based on their status punishes them 
twice for the same crime. 
Specifically, in the case of Brown v. Michigan City, the Seventh 
Circuit had the opportunity to decide about the rights of Mr. Brown 
without looking at the outcome. There is no Supreme Court precedent 
as to whether child safety zone legislation is constitutional or whether 
banning an individual from a park is constitutional and the facts of the 
case are distinguishable from that of the Doe v. Lafayette. Further, in 
regards to Mr. Brown’s liberty interest in his reputation, this ordinance 
was specifically tailored to him and identified him as a present threat 
to children. It resulted in a change of status that could satisfy the test 
propounded in Paul v. Davis. And finally, the court glossed over this 
analysis and found this ordinance to pass rational basis review. 
According to this precedent, as established by the Seventh Circuit, 
sex offenders do not have the rights of a citizen. Sex offenders only 
have rights which are left to them after legislation is done with them. 
Currently, they do not have the right to remain anonymous, the right to 
live where they choose, the right to loiter where they choose, and 
possibly the right to enter a public park. As legislation against sex 
offenders continues its growth it is unclear what rights sex offenders 
will be left with. 
                                                 
216 See Hobson, supra note 193, at 987. 
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In order to protect this “unpopular” group, the judiciary must not 
follow the tyranny of the majority.  The Seventh Circuit and other 
courts must make reasoned decisions based on the law, not the 
outcome and apply a stricter standard of review when the fundamental 
rights of an unpopular group are slowly being stripped away. 
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